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Explicit, Express, and Everything in Between:  
The Quid Pro Quo Requirement for Bribery  
and Hobbs Act Prosecutions in the 2000s 
Ilissa B. Gold  
INTRODUCTION 
A newly elected governor establishes a campaign in support of a 
ballot initiative to create a state lottery.
1
 A wealthy supporter of the 
governor‘s opponent in the prior election wishes to curry favor with 
the new administration.
2
 As the CEO of a large healthcare services 
provider, he also wishes to retain his company‘s seat on the state‘s 
commission for licensing new healthcare facilities.
3
 The supporter 
decides to make a large financial donation to the new governor‘s 
lottery campaign.
4
 The governor indicates to his aide that he knows 
the supporter wants to keep his seat.
5
 A week later, the governor duly 
re-appoints the contributor to the commission.
6
 
Were the governor‘s actions corrupt, unethical, or an example of 
―politics as usual‖? One can easily see how this situation could be 
viewed as any of the above. But should such actions be illegal? The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit believed they 
should, affirming the conviction of former Alabama Governor Don 
Siegelman for bribery, honest services mail fraud, and conspiracy for 
performing the exact actions described above.
7
 The Eleventh Circuit 
 
   B.A. (2008), Cornell University; J.D. (2011), Washington University in St. Louis. 
 1. See United States v. Siegelman, 561 F.3d 1215, 1220–22 (11th Cir. 2009), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 1220–21. 
 5. Id. at 1220. 
 6. Id. at 1221–22. 
 7. Id. at 1245. 
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reasoned that even without proof of an actual agreement or 
conversation between Governor Siegelman and HealthSouth CEO 
Richard Scrushy, the jury could infer a direct agreement from their 
words and actions.
8
 It was enough, according to the court, that 
Governor Siegelman took the payment knowing that it had been 
made in the hopes that he would perform an official act to benefit 
Scrushy.
9
 
But is this the correct standard for determining whether a 
campaign donation crosses the line to bribery or extortion? A line of 
federal cases from the last twenty years strongly signals that it is not. 
Instead, there must be an explicit quid pro quo agreement between a 
contributor and public official for a campaign donation to be illegal 
either under the bribery statute
10
 or the Hobbs Act, which bans 
extortion by public officials.
11
 The Supreme Court first set this 
standard in McCormick v. United States,
12
 holding that campaign 
donations to a public official would cross the line into illegal bribery 
or extortion only if made in return for an explicit quid pro quo 
agreement from an official to perform or not perform a specific act.
13
 
Only a year later, however, the Supreme Court weighed in on 
another case of Hobbs Act extortion by a public official in Evans v. 
United States.
14
 The Evans court determined that in such a case of 
extortion, ―the Government need only show that a public official has 
obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the 
payment was made in return for official acts.‖15 The Court did not 
indicate, however, whether Evans was to be treated as a campaign 
contribution case, as opposed to a non-campaign case simply dealing 
with a bribe to a public official, or whether the holding in Evans 
modified McCormick’s holding in any sense.16 
 
 8. Id. at 1226. 
 9. See id. ―The ‗Government need only show that a public official has obtained a 
payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official 
acts.‘‖ Id. (quoting United States v. Evans, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992)). 
 10. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2006). 
 11. 18 U.S.C. § 1951. 
 12. 500 U.S. 257 (1991). 
 13. Id. at 273. 
 14. 504 U.S. 255 (1992). 
 15. Id. at 268. 
 16. See infra notes 55, 115–16. 
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Since Evans, three Circuits—the Second,17 Sixth,18 and Ninth19—
have determined that McCormick and Evans established different 
standards, with McCormick governing campaign contribution cases 
and Evans governing any other instances of public officials receiving 
bribes. Two other Circuits—the Third20 and Seventh21—have 
indicated that they will hold McCormick to be the sole standard for 
campaign contribution cases in the future. The Eleventh Circuit 
stands alone in trying to reconcile McCormick and Evans in the 
campaign context in United States v. Siegelman.
22
 
The Eleventh Circuit‘s decision is highly questionable on several 
grounds. The court attempts to reconcile McCormick and Evans by 
reading language into Evans that is not present.
23
 The court also 
boldly states that in some instances, the word ―explicit,‖ as applied to 
a quid pro quo agreement in McCormick, can actually mean the exact 
opposite, ―implicit.‖24 On broader public policy grounds, the 
Eleventh Circuit‘s holding could have the effect of chilling political 
speech and allowing prosecutorial discretion to be wielded in a 
partisan manner.
25
 For these reasons, until the Supreme Court 
clarifies the proper relationship between McCormick and Evans, the 
bright-line rule established by McCormick should remain as the sole 
standard for campaign contribution cases. 
Part I of this Note examines the history of the explicit quid pro 
quo requirement, including: (1) the passage of the Hobbs Act; (2) the 
early cases considering extortion under the color of official right; (3) 
the Supreme Court decisions in McCormick and Evans; and (4) the 
ways in which the various Circuits have construed the different 
standards established by these cases. Part II of this Note focuses 
specifically on the Eleventh Circuit‘s decision in Siegelman and 
analyzes why this decision is problematic on doctrinal grounds.
26
 Part 
 
 17. United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 142–44 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J.). 
 18. United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 516–19 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 19. United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 936–38 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 20. United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 257 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 21. United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 411–12 (7th Cir. 1993). 
  22. 561 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 23. See infra notes 113–16. 
 24. See infra notes 67, 127–30. 
 25. See infra notes 138–41. 
 26. This Note will not discuss, however, the serious allegations of prosecutorial 
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III of this Note proposes that McCormick and Evans should remain as 
separate standards governing different contexts, because the Eleventh 
Circuit‘s decision could have dire consequences for candidates and 
elections. 
I. HISTORY 
A. The Evolution of the Quid Pro Quo Requirement 
Congress adopted the Hobbs Act in 1946,
27
 which prohibited 
extortion affecting interstate commerce.
28
 The initial intent of this 
legislation was to curtail labor racketeering activities
29
 rather than the 
acceptance of bribes by public officials.
30
 In 1972, however, the 
 
misconduct and political motives raised in Siegelman, including the fact that the original United 
States Attorney assigned to the case was the wife of Governor Siegelman‘s election opponent, 
initially refusing to recuse herself from the case, and the question of possible improper 
communication between her office and former White House advisor Karl Rove. For summaries 
of these allegations, see Allegations of Selective Prosecution: The Erosion of Public Confidence 
in our Federal Justice System: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Sec. and the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); James K. Robinson, Restoring Public Confidence in the 
Fairness of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Justice Function, 2 HARV. L. & POL‘Y REV. 
237, 249–50 (2008); Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States 
Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 385–87 (2009); see also 60 Minutes: Did Ex-Alabama 
Governor Get a Raw Deal? (CBS television broadcast Feb. 24, 2008), available at http://www 
.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/02/21/60minutes/main3859830.shtml. 
 27. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006). 
 28. The statute defines ―extortion‖ as ―the obtaining of property from another, with his 
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color 
of official right.‖ Id. § 1951(b)(2). 
 29. The Hobbs Act replaced the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, which contained an 
exception for ―the payment of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee‖ from 
charges of racketeering. Ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979, 980 (1934). The Supreme Court held that this 
phrase would remove union activity by an employee from the scope of the act—in this 
particular case, union members who demanded additional fees from owners and drivers of 
trucks entering New York City for the union members to unload their trucks. See United States 
v. Local 807 Int‘l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521, 535 (1942). The subsequent debate over the 
Hobbs Act revealed that Congress intended ―to shut off the possibility opened up by the Local 
807 case, that union members could use their protected status to exact payments from 
employers for imposed, unwanted, and superfluous services.‖ United States v. Enmons, 410 
U.S. 396, 403 (1973); see also 91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep. Hancock) 
(―This bill is designed simply to prevent both union members and nonunion people from 
making use of robbery and extortion under the guise of obtaining wages in the obstruction of 
interstate commerce.‖). 
 30. Medrith Lee Hager, Note, The Hobbs Act: Maintaining the Distinction Between a 
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United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the 
Hobbs Act applied to public officials for government corruption.
31
 
The court determined that a charge of extortion did not require a 
specific coercive action.
32
 Instead, the court defined extortion ―under 
color of official right‖ as the ―wrongful taking by a public officer of 
money not due him or his office.‖33 
Following this decision, a number of circuits held that in order to 
prevent all donations or gifts to public officials from coming under 
the scope of Hobbs Act extortion, the government must prove that the 
official received money in exchange ―for specific promises to do or 
refrain from doing specific things.‖34 The Fifth Circuit first explicitly 
described this requirement as a quid pro quo in United States v. 
Dozier.
35
 The court rejected the argument that a conviction for such 
agreements would punish the legal solicitation of campaign donations 
and maintained that the courts needed to overlook attempts by 
politicians to abuse the fundraising system.
36
 The Sixth
37
 and the 
 
Bribe and a Gift, 83 KY. L.J. 197, 197–98 (1995). 
 31. See United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1228–29 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 32. Id. at 1229. 
 33. Id. Extortion under color of official right can also be defined as ―the seeking or receipt 
of a corrupt payment by a public official (or a pretended public official) because of his office or 
his ability to influence official action.‖ James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of 
the Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 1696 (1993). 
 34. United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116, 1127 n.1 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1573 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 537 
(5th Cir. 1982). 
 35. 672 F.2d at 537. Dozier, the onetime Commissioner of Agriculture in Louisiana, had 
been convicted under the Hobbs Act for soliciting bribes from contributors with interests related 
to the Louisiana Department of Agriculture. See id. at 535.  
 36. See id. at 537 (―Our need to avoid hampering honest candidates who must solicit 
funds from prospective supporters does not require that the courts abandon this necessary, if 
troublesome, realm of political maneuver to those who would abuse its opportunities.‖). The 
Fifth Circuit ruled that it could rely on its own discretion to differentiate between legal 
campaign donations and extortionate activity, defining the latter as involving a payoff or a quid 
pro quo:  
A moment‘s reflection should enable one to distinguish, at least in the abstract, a 
legitimate solicitation from the exaction of a fee for a benefit conferred or an injury 
withheld. Whether described familiarly as a payoff or with the Latinate precision of 
quid pro quo, the prohibited exchange is the same: a public official may not demand 
payment as inducement for the promise to perform (or not to perform) an official act. 
Id. The court held that because the public official in this case had made the performance or non-
performance of his official activities contingent upon the payment of money, he had committed 
extortion under color of official right. See id. at 540. 
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Eleventh Circuits
38
 both followed the Fifth Circuit‘s requirement 
shortly thereafter, and held that the government must prove the 
existence of a quid pro quo to avoid convicting public officials or 
contributors over legal campaign donations.
39
 The Second
40
 and 
Seventh
41
 Circuits, however, rejected such a need for a quid pro quo 
agreement between officials and contributors.  
B. McCormick v. United States 
To resolve this split, the Supreme Court considered whether proof 
of the existence of a quid pro quo agreement is required for 
conviction under the Hobbs Act in McCormick v. United States.
42
 
Robert L. McCormick was a member of the West Virginia House of 
Delegates, who sponsored legislation allowing foreign medical 
 
 At the very least, elected officials are, and have been, on notice that any public 
officer, elected or otherwise, who makes performance (or non-performance) of an 
official act contingent upon payment of a fee-whether or not the fee actually is paid or 
the act actually performed-is guilty of extortion ―under color of official right.‖ 
Id. 
 37. Bibby, 752 F.2d at 1116. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Hobbs Act conviction of a 
Tennessee state senator for receiving payments characterized as campaign contributions from 
two business associates in return for his assistance in awarding state computer contracts to a 
particular company. See id. at 1119. 
 38. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d at 1561. The court reversed the extortion conviction of a Florida 
state senator accused of taking a bribe in the form of a campaign contribution to help an 
unqualified applicant obtain a liquor license. See id. at 1564. Citing Dozier, the court held that 
the senator could not be convicted of Hobbs Act extortion if there was no proof that his 
demands for a contribution were accompanied by a promise ―to perform some act of official 
grace.‖ Id. at 1573. 
 39. Bibby, 752 F.2d at 1127 n.1. The court noted that if the rule were applied literally, 
―any political contribution could conceivably provide the basis for a Hobbs Act charge.‖ Id. 
Instead, the government must show that the official made a specific promise to perform a 
specific act in exchange for money—―[i]n other words, there must be a quid pro quo.‖ Id. In 
Haimowitz, the conviction of the state senator was overturned specifically because there was no 
quid pro quo. 725 F.2d at 1573. 
 40. United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1975). The court found that 
while a quid pro quo may be forthcoming in an extortion case, it is not an essential element of 
the crime. See id. at 1098, 1100. What mattered is that the payments were motivated by the 
recipient‘s office. Id. at 1100. 
41. United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir. 1987). The Seventh Circuit 
considered the act of receiving payments or assistance to be extortion ―if the official knows that 
the bribe, gift, or other favor is motivated by a hope that it will influence him in the exercise of 
his office and if, knowing this, he accepts the bribe.‖ Id. at 311. 
 42. 500 U.S. 257 (1991). 
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students and doctors to earn licenses to practice in the state prior to 
taking the state licensing exams in return for a campaign donation 
from the doctors‘ organization.43 As a result, McCormick was 
indicted by a federal grand jury for ―five counts of violating the 
Hobbs Act, by extorting payments under color of official right, and 
with one count of filing a false income tax return.‖44 The Fourth 
Circuit affirmed the District Court, rejecting McCormick‘s argument 
that the conviction of an elected official under the Hobbs Act 
required proof of a quid pro quo.
45
  
The Supreme Court reversed, holding instead that political 
contributions taken under color of official right would only be 
vulnerable to Hobbs Act prosecution if the payments were made in 
return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to 
perform or not to perform an official act.
46
 In these situations, the 
official asserts that his or her official conduct would be controlled by 
the terms of the promise or undertaking.
47
  
The Court noted that supporting legislation to benefit the district 
is the everyday business of a legislator and that candidates must 
constantly solicit money for campaigns.
48
 It would be unrealistic, 
according to the Court, to hold that legislators commit extortion when 
they act for the benefit of constituents, shortly before or after 
 
 43. See id. at 259–61. To alleviate the problem of doctor shortages in rural areas, West 
Virginia allowed foreign medical students to practice medicine under temporary licenses prior 
to taking state licensing exams, a program McCormick strongly supported. Id. at 259. In 
response to an attempt in the early 1980s to end this program, a group of temporarily licensed 
doctors hired a lobbyist to work for legislation to extend the expiration date of the program, 
while McCormick sponsored a bill in the House of Delegates in 1984 to extend the program for 
another year. Id. at 259–60. During his 1984 reelection campaign, McCormick informed the 
lobbyist that his campaign was expensive ―and that he had not heard anything from the foreign 
doctors.‖ Id. at 260. The lobbyist subsequently arranged for several thousand dollars worth of 
payments to McCormick, which were neither listed as campaign contributions nor reported on 
McCormick‘s 1984 federal income tax return. Id.  
 44. Id. at 261. 
 45. United States v. McCormick, 896 F.2d 61, 66 (4th Cir. 1990). The circuit court instead 
interpreted the statute to not require ―such a showing where the parties never intended the 
payments to be ‗legitimate‘ campaign contributions.‖ McCormick, 500 U.S. at 266. 
 46. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 273. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 272 (―Money is constantly being solicited on behalf of candidates, who run 
on platforms and who claim support on the basis of their views and what they intend to do or 
have done.‖). 
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soliciting or receiving contributions from those beneficiaries.
49
 To do 
so ―would open to prosecution not only [political] conduct . . . long 
. . . thought to be well within the law ―but also conduct that in a very 
real sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed 
by private contributions or expenditures.‖50 This holding, however, 
was expressly limited to cases involving campaign donations.
51
 
C. Evans v. United States 
Only a year later, the Supreme Court again considered the 
question of the requirements for conviction under the Hobbs Act in 
Evans v. United States.
52
 John Evans was an elected member of the 
Board of Commissioners of DeKalb County in Georgia who took a 
bribe from an undercover Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
agent.
53
 The agent posed as a real estate developer who wanted 
Evans‘ assistance in rezoning a tract of land for the developer‘s 
benefit.
54
  
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. This holding fits with long-standing Supreme Court precedent of protecting such 
speech or conduct within the campaign context on First Amendment grounds. See, e.g., Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 895 (2010) (―As additional rules are created 
for regulating political speech, any speech arguably within their reach is chilled.‖); id. at 898 
(―[P]olitical speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or 
inadvertence.‖); Fed. Election Comm‘n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) 
(―[T]he First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than 
suppressing it.‖); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (―A restriction on the amount of 
money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily 
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of 
their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.‖). 
 51. 500 U.S. at 274 n.10 (―[W]e do not decide whether a quid pro quo requirement exists 
in other contexts, such as when an elected official receives gifts, meals, travel expenses, or 
other items of value.‖). In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed that this standard would 
not apply to ―campaign contributions with anticipation of favorable future action, as opposed to 
campaign contributions in exchange for an explicit promise of favorable future action.‖ Id. at 
276 (Scalia, J., concurring). However, he disagreed with the Court on the proper definition of 
―under color of official right,‖ arguing that it connotes a sense of entitlement rather than simply 
―on account of one‘s office.‖ Id. at 278–79. 
 52. 504 U.S. 255 (1992). 
 53. Id. at 257. 
 54. Id. After several prior meetings, Evans met with the agent again in July of 1986 to 
inform the agent that he needed money for his re-election campaign and present the agent with 
a list of his expenses. See United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790, 793 (11th Cir. 1990). Evans did 
not explicitly promise to perform a specific act for the agent, but stated, ―I‘ve promised to help 
you. I‘m gonna work to do that.‖ Id. at 794. On July 25, the agent gave Evans $7,000 in cash 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol36/iss1/11
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As a result of his acceptance of this bribe,
55
 the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia convicted Evans of 
Hobbs Act extortion and failure to report income.
56
 The Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed, holding that passive acceptance of a benefit by a 
public official is sufficient to form the basis of a Hobbs Act violation, 
and the public official need not take any specific affirmative action to 
induce the offering of the benefit.
57
 The Supreme Court affirmed on 
the inducement issue, holding that to convict a public official under 
the Hobbs Act, ―the Government need only show that a public 
official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, 
knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.‖58 
In addition to the inducement claim, Evans challenged the jury 
instructions from his trial on the grounds that they did not ―properly 
describe the quid pro quo requirement for conviction if the jury found 
that the payment was a campaign contribution.‖59 The Court rejected 
 
and a $1,000 check for his campaign. Evans, 504 U.S. at 257. Evans reported the campaign 
donation on his disclosure form, but did not report the cash on his federal income tax return. Id. 
 55. The Court never specifically indicated whether or not the bribe in question included 
the reported campaign contribution. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas stated that the 
holding in Evans extended McCormick‘s quid pro quo requirement to all Hobbs Act extortion 
cases. 504 U.S. at 286 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This statement implies that Evans, unlike 
McCormick, was not specifically considered to be a campaign contribution case. Peter D. 
Hardy, Note, The Emerging Role of the Quid Pro Quo Requirement in Public Corruption 
Prosecutions Under the Hobbs Act, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 409, 427 (1995). 
 56. Evans, 504 U.S. at 257–58. 
 57. Id. at 258. 
 58. Id. at 268. The Court reasoned that an act of affirmative inducement was not 
necessary, because the public office itself provided the coercive element for inducing a bribe. 
Id. at 266. Therefore, ―the wrongful acceptance of a bribe [by a public official] establishes all 
the inducement that the statute requires.‖ Id. Although this case dealt with a conviction for 
extortion, the Court refers to public officials taking bribes throughout the opinion, observing 
that under the common law, ―[e]xtortion by the public official was the rough equivalent of what 
we would now describe as ‗taking a bribe.‘‖ Id. at 260. Furthermore, ―[i]f the [Hobbs] Act is 
read in full, the distinction between bribery and extortion becomes unnecessary where public 
officials are involved.‖ Id. at 267 n.18 (quoting Herbert J. Stern, Prosecutions of Local Political 
Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The Unnecessary Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion, 
3 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 14 (1971)). Evans thus brings cases of public officials receiving 
bribes under the Hobbs Act standards, something Scalia predicted could happen in his 
concurrence in McCormick. See 500 U.S. 257, 278 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (―It is 
acceptance of the assumption that ‗under color of official right‘ means ‗on account of one‘s 
office‘ that brings bribery cases within the statute‘s reach . . . .‖); see also Lindgren, supra note 
33, at 1718 (arguing that extortion under color of official right and bribery were treated as 
similar offenses under the common law). 
 59. Evans, 504 U.S. at 268. The relevant jury instructions stated that: 
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this criticism, specifically noting that the jury instruction satisfied the 
quid pro quo requirement of McCormick, and that the public official 
completes the offense at the time when he or she receives payment in 
return for agreeing to perform specific official acts.
60
 Fulfillment of 
the quid pro quo by the public official was not required for the Hobbs 
Act conviction.
61
 Evans, therefore, left intact the explicit quid pro quo 
standard for campaign contribution cases from McCormick.
62
 
Justice Kennedy‘s concurring opinion, however, injected some 
uncertainty into the debate over how Evans and McCormick fit 
together.
63
 In his opinion, Justice Kennedy addressed the quid pro 
quo issue ―more directly‖ than the majority.64 Kennedy defined the 
 
[T]he acceptance by an elected official of a campaign contribution does not, in itself, 
constitute a violation of the Hobbs Act even though the donor has business pending 
before the official.  
 However, if a public official demands or accepts money in exchange for [a] specific 
requested exercise of his or her official power, such a demand or acceptance does 
constitute a violation of the Hobbs Act regardless of whether the payment is made in 
the form of a campaign contribution.  
Id. at 258. 
 60. Id. at 268. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. ―We reject petitioner‘s criticism of the [jury] instruction, and conclude that it 
satisfies the quid pro quo requirement of McCormick v. United States . . . .‖ Id. Justice 
Kennedy‘s concurrence also notes that the majority opinion upheld the quid pro quo 
requirement: 
Although the Court appears to accept the requirement of a quid pro quo as an 
alternative rationale, in my view this element of the offense is essential to a 
determination of those acts which are criminal and those which are not in a case in 
which the official does not pretend that he is entitled by law to the property in 
question.  
Id. at 272–73 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Steven C. Yarbrough, The Hobbs Act in the 
Nineties: Confusion or Clarification of the Quid Pro Quo Standard in Extortion Cases 
Involving Public Officials, 31 TULSA L.J. 781, 794 (1996) (―[T]he Court expressly stated what 
the government must show to satisfy the Court‘s quid pro quo element.‖); Hager, supra note 30, 
at 214–15 (―Thus, after Evans, four Justices believed that the government must demonstrate a 
quid pro quo in all cases involving extortion under color of official right, while the opinion 
joined by four others included language which could arguably support such an inference.‖). 
 63. Hager, supra note 30, at 215. 
 64. Id. at 214. Although Kennedy‘s opinion was a concurrence in a 6–3 decision, many 
courts since Evans have relied on Kennedy‘s discussion of the quid pro quo issue in 
determining how to distinguish the opinion from McCormick. See, e.g., United States v. 
Blandford, 33 F.3d 685, 696 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Kennedy‘s concurrence in Evans as a 
―gloss‖ on the McCormick Court‘s use of the word ―explicit‖). 
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quid pro quo in this context as a public official leading a payor to 
believe that, absent payment, the official will abuse his ―official 
right‖ to the payor‘s detriment, or will give the payor less favorable 
treatment if the quid pro quo is not satisfied.
65
 However, according to 
Kennedy, ―the [public] official and the payor need not state the quid 
pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law‘s effect could be 
frustrated by knowing winks and nods.‖66 The circuits that have 
confronted public official extortion cases since Evans, therefore, have 
been left to reconcile the requirement of explicitness in a quid pro 
quo agreement from McCormick with Justice Kennedy‘s argument 
that a quid pro quo need not be express.
67
 
D. Majority View—McCormick and Evans Establish Different 
Standards 
Following Evans, the majority of circuits have not attempted to 
reconcile directly Evans and McCormick, but have held that the two 
cases each apply to different situations, with Evans as the standard 
for non-campaign contribution cases and McCormick as the standard 
 
 65. Evans, 504 U.S. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 66. Id. Inducement from a public official would be criminal regardless of whether it is 
express or ―implied from his words and actions, so long as he intends it to be so and the payor 
so interprets it.‖ Id. 
 67. The difference between ―explicit‖ and ―express‖ is not entirely clear. In one of the 
earliest federal cases of Hobbs Act extortion following Evans, the Sixth Circuit tried to 
reconcile the two standards and determined that ―Evans instructed that by ‗explicit‘ McCormick 
did not mean ‗express.‘‖ Blandford, 33 F.3d at 696. The Court distinguished the two words by 
their respective definitions in Black‘s Law Dictionary, which defined ―explicit‖ as ―[n]ot 
obscure or ambiguous, having no disguised meaning or reservation. Clear in understanding.‖ 
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 579 (6th ed. 1990). ―Express,‖ however, was defined as: 
Clear; definite; explicit; plain; direct; unmistakable; not dubious or ambiguous. 
Declared in terms; set forth in words. Directly and distinctly stated. Made known 
distinctly and explicitly, and not left to inference. Manifested by direct and appropriate 
language, as distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct. The word is 
usually contrasted with ―implied.‖ 
Id. at 580 (citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit later relied upon the distinction in Blandford 
in determining that McCormick did not require quid pro quo agreements to be express. See 
United States v. Siegelman, 561 F.3d 1215, 1226 (11th Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded on 
other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (2010). However, the most recent edition of Black‘s Law 
Dictionary does not even define ―explicit‖ as a separate term, but only defines ―express‖ as 
―clearly and unmistakably communicated; directly stated.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 661 
(9th ed. 2009). 
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for campaign contribution cases.
68
 The Seventh Circuit first held 
McCormick as the proper standard for a campaign contribution case 
in United States v. Allen.
69
 When it discussed McCormick, the court 
noted that ―absent some fairly explicit language otherwise, accepting 
a campaign contribution does not equal taking a bribe unless the 
payment is made in exchange for an explicit promise to perform or 
not perform an official act.‖70 Vague expectations of a future benefit 
would not be sufficient to make a campaign contribution an illegal 
bribe.
71
 
While not specifically ruling on a McCormick issue, the Third 
Circuit nonetheless also indicated it would hold McCormick as the 
sole standard for campaign contribution cases.
72
 In United States v. 
Antico, the court declined to extend the holding of McCormick to a 
non-campaign contribution case.
73
 The court noted that the Supreme 
Court had expressly limited its holding in McCormick to the 
campaign contribution cases, and indicated that the Evans standard 
applies only in the non-campaign contribution context.
74
 
 
 68. Yarbrough, supra note 62, at 796. 
 69. 10 F.3d 405, 411 (7th Cir. 1993). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction of a 
deputy sheriff and former city councilman in Gary, Indiana, who solicited campaign 
contributions for the Lake County Sheriff‘s re-election campaign from two undercover FBI 
agents in return for protecting an illegal gambling establishment set up by the FBI. Id. at 407–
10. 
 70. Id. at 411. The Seventh Circuit ultimately declined to apply McCormick to this case, 
as Allen had not been convicted of Hobbs Act extortion but of racketeering, which did not 
require the government to prove bribery. Id. at 412. The court did note, however, that extortion 
―under color of official right‖ and bribery were simply ―different sides of the same coin,‖ with 
minimal differences. Id. at 411. 
 71. Id. Moreover, according to the court, ―[i]t would be naive to suppose that contributors 
do not expect some benefit—support for favorable legislation, for example—for their 
contributions.‖ Id. Although the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the different holding in Evans 
in a string cite, it held McCormick as the sole standard for a campaign contribution case. Id.; see 
also Yarbrough, supra note 62, at 798 (―It appears that, under its current analysis, the Seventh 
Circuit will apply the explicit standard of McCormick to campaign contribution cases without 
consideration of how Evans might affect this standard.‖).  
 72. United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 254 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 73. Id. at 257. The case dealt with an official in the Philadelphia Department of Licenses 
and Inspections demanding payment from businesses to approve their zoning permits and 
licenses and threatening retaliation if they did not pay. Id. at 249. 
 74. The court explained: 
Outside the campaign contribution context, where Antico‘s case falls, the line between 
legal and illegal acceptance of money is not so nuanced. The Hobbs Act simply states 
that use of one's office to obtain money or services not due is extortion: ―the 
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1. The Second Circuit: Explicit and Express  
Through a series of decisions, the Second Circuit has firmly 
determined that the Evans standard applies exclusively to non-
campaign contribution cases.
75
 The court, in United States v. Garcia, 
initially held that McCormick and Evans establish different 
standards.
76
 Immediately thereafter, the Second Circuit upheld the 
standard of applying Evans exclusively to non-campaign contribution 
cases in two more decisions.
77
 Although the Second Circuit did not 
decide any cases dealing specifically with campaign contributions 
during this period, the court firmly determined that Evans was the 
sole standard for non-campaign contribution cases, implying 
McCormick to be a separate standard for campaign contribution 
cases.
78
 
 
Government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he 
was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.‖ 
Id. at 257–58 (quoting United States v. Evans, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992)). 
 75. See United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J.); United 
States v. Delano, 55 F.3d 720, 731 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 113–14 
(2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Garcia, 992 F.2d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Yarbrough, 
supra note 62, at 801 (―The Second Circuit has issued three opinions since 1993 which 
demonstrate that the Second Circuit will decide non-campaign contribution cases exclusively by 
reference to Evans.‖). 
76. 992 F.2d at 414. The case dealt with a congressman from New York City convicted 
of extorting cash and loans from a defense company in return for helping the company obtain 
contracts with the Navy and the Postal Service. Id. at 410–12. However, the Second Circuit 
reversed Garcia‘s conviction, holding that McCormick and Evans both required the district 
court to issue a jury instruction on quid pro quo agreements. Id. at 414. Specifically, the court 
held that while McCormick mandated the finding of an explicit quid pro quo agreement in 
circumstances involving campaign contributions, ―Evans modified this standard in non-
campaign contribution cases.‖ Id. Evans modified the standard ―by requiring that the 
government show only ‗that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not 
entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.‘‖ Id. (quoting Evans, 
504 U.S. at 268). The government was still required to prove a quid pro quo, but such an 
agreement did not need to be explicit because this was a non-campaign contribution case. See 
id. at 415. 
 77. See Delano, 55 F.3d at 731 (―[P]roof of an explicit promise to perform the official acts 
in return for the payment is not required.‖); Coyne, 4 F.3d at 111 (―Proof of an explicit promise 
at the time of payment to perform certain acts is not necessary, and the jury was free to infer 
that Coyne accepted the $30,000 knowing that it was payment related to his using his influence 
as County Executive . . . .‖). 
 78. See Yarbrough, supra note 62, at 801 (―[T]he Second Circuit‘s interpretation of Evans 
cannot be reconciled with McCormick, which incontrovertibly applies to campaign contribution 
cases.‖). The Second Circuit could not easily reconcile McCormick and Evans now because 
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The Second Circuit recently reaffirmed this separation between 
the McCormick and Evans standards in another extortion case, United 
States v. Ganim.
79
 The court applied the Evans standard,
80
 holding 
that the government did not need to prove an explicit quid pro quo for 
a Hobbs Act conviction, but only rather must prove that a payment 
was made to a public official in exchange for a commitment to 
perform official acts to benefit the payor in the future.
81
 
Notably, the Second Circuit also firmly held that McCormick 
establishes a different standard from Evans. The court characterized 
the holding of McCormick by stating ―proof of an express promise is 
necessary when the payments are made in the form of campaign 
contributions.‖82 However, ―Evans modified this standard in the non-
campaign [context],‖ and Kennedy‘s concurrence from Evans only 
applied to those non-campaign contribution cases.
83
 Through this 
holding, the Second Circuit established that it will apply 
McCormick‘s requirement of an explicit quid pro quo agreement for 
extortion and bribery convictions to campaign contribution cases, 
 
Garcia, Coyne, and Delano all expressly state that an explicit promise is not required under 
Evans, while McCormick does expressly state that such a promise is required. Id. at 802. 
 79. 510 F.3d at 142–43. Joseph Ganim, the former mayor of Bridgeport, Connecticut, was 
convicted of racketeering and Hobbs Act extortion in 2003 for funneling government contracts 
to companies fronted by two of his aides, who in turn provided Ganim with cash, meals, and 
other benefits out of their earnings over several years. See id. at 137–41. 
 80. See id. at 143 (―Drawing from Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence in Evans, we found [in 
Garcia] that a quid pro quo was required to sustain a conviction in the non-campaign context, 
but that the agreement may be implied from the official‘s words and actions . . . .‖). 
 81. Id. at 147. The Second Circuit also found that proof of a quid pro quo was required 
not only for the Hobbs Act extortion charges, but for the charges of bribery and honest services 
mail fraud as well. Id. at 141 (―[E]ach of these statutes criminalizes, in some respect, a quid pro 
quo agreement—to wit, a government official‘s receipt of a benefit in exchange for an act he 
has performed, or promised to perform, in the exercise of his official authority.‖); id. at 148 
(―[T]he crime of bribery requires a quid pro quo.‖). The court continued: 
[B]ribery is not proved if the benefit is intended to be, and accepted as simply an effort 
to buy favor or generalized goodwill from a public official who either has been, is, or 
may be at some unknown, unspecified later time, be in a position to act favorably on 
the giver‘s interests—favorably to the giver‘s interest. That describes legal lobbying. 
Id. at 149 (citation omitted). 
 82. Id. at 142 (emphasis added). Here, ―express‖ is used as a synonym for ―explicit,‖ the 
word used in McCormick. See supra note 67 for an explanation on the difference between the 
two words. 
 83. 510 F.3d at 143. 
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while Evans will remain the separate standard for non-campaign 
contribution cases.
84
 
2. The Sixth Circuit: Reconciliation and Separation 
The Sixth Circuit initially attempted to reconcile McCormick and 
Evans
85
 when it held that both standards applied to campaign 
contribution cases in United States v. Blandford.
86
 In evaluating the 
different standards for a quid pro quo agreement as set forth in 
McCormick and Evans, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the 
ambiguous effect of Evans on McCormick.
87
 However, the court 
ultimately rejected the idea that the two decisions led to two different 
standards, holding that Evans had modified McCormick such that the 
quid pro quo element would be ―satisfied by something short of a 
formalized and thoroughly articulated contractual arrangement.‖88 
The court cited Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence from Evans in finding 
that the latter decision had clarified the definition of the word 
―explicit.‖89 Evans did not differentiate between campaign and non-
 
 84. Id. at 143–44. Recently, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the holding in Ganim in 
determining that McCormick and Evans establish different standards. See United States v. 
Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 937 (9th Cir. 2009) (―In the case of a public official who 
obtains money, other than a campaign contribution, the Government does not have to prove an 
explicit promise to perform a particular act made at the time of the payment.‖). 
 85. Yarbrough, supra note 62, at 803. 
 86. 33 F.3d 685, 697 (6th Cir. 1994). The court affirmed the Hobbs Act conviction of the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives of Kentucky for extorting cash payments from horse 
racing industry lobbyists in return for helping to block restrictive regulations on horse racing. 
See id. at 688–90. On appeal, Blandford claimed that the jury should have been required to find 
that he had entered into an explicit quid pro quo agreement in order to convict him. Id. at 693. 
 87. Id. at 695. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the public policy arguments for treating 
campaign contribution cases different from non-campaign contribution cases, noting that 
campaign contributions enjoy ―a presumption of legitimacy.‖ Id. at 697 (―[L]egitimate 
campaign contributions, not unlike Hobbs Act extortion payments, are given with the hope, and 
perhaps expectation, that the payment will make the official more likely to support the payor‘s 
interests . . . .‖). Meanwhile, it would be difficult for a public official receiving payments from a 
private source outside of the campaign context to explain his actions. See id. (―[W]here, as in 
this case, a public official‘s primary justification for receiving, with relative impunity, cash 
payments from private sources, i.e., our present campaign financing system, is not available, 
that public official is left with few other means of rationalizing his actions.‖). 
 88. Id. at 696. ―[M]erely knowing the payment was made in return for official acts is 
enough.‖ Id.  
 89. Id. (―In this sense, then, Evans provided a gloss on the McCormick Court‘s use of the 
word ‗explicit‘ to qualify its quid pro quo requirement.‖). 
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campaign contribution cases, according to the court, but simply 
―instructed that by ‗explicit‘ McCormick did not mean ‗express.‘‖90  
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that both standards applied to 
campaign contribution cases, holding that to sustain a Hobbs Act 
conviction, the government must establish the existence of a quid pro 
quo as in McCormick, but informed by the standard from Evans.
91
 
While the Sixth Circuit did not rule on the proper standard for the 
non-campaign context, it reconciled the ―explicit‖ and ―knowing‖ 
standards specifically within the campaign contribution context.
92
 
Recently, however, the Sixth Circuit appeared to adopt a standard 
more in line with that of the Second and Ninth Circuits. In United 
States v. Abbey, the court firmly held that Evans established a 
different standard for non-campaign contribution cases.
93
 The court 
characterized its holding from Blandford not as a reconciliation of the 
McCormick and Evans standards, but merely as a statement that 
McCormick‘s quid pro quo requirement—the explicitness 
requirement—should not apply outside of the campaign context.94 
While an explicit quid pro quo promise would be required within the 
campaign context, ―merely knowing that the payment was made in 
return for official acts is enough‖ to prove extortion in a non-
campaign case such as Abbey.
95
 While not specifically stating how 
 
 90. Id. ―Explicit, as explained in Evans, speaks not to the form of the agreement between 
the payor and the payee, but to the degree to which the payor and payee were aware of its terms, 
regardless of whether those terms were articulated.‖ Id. For a fuller explanation of the 
difference between the words ―explicit‖ and ―express,‖ see supra note 67. 
 91. 33 F.3d at 696–97. 
 92. Yarbrough, supra note 62, at 805–06. 
 93. 560 F.3d 513, 517–18 (6th Cir. 2009). The case concerned the Hobbs Act conviction 
of the former City Administrator of Burton, Michigan, for taking bribes and a free subdivision 
lot from a local land developer in return for unspecified future official favors. See id. at 515–16. 
 94. Id. at 517. The court further observed that the campaign contribution context was 
unique because almost all lawful contributions are given to influence future legislative or 
executive actions. Id. at 516. However, ―if the quid pro quo requirement exists to ensure that an 
otherwise permissible activity is not unfairly criminalized, then an opposite presumption is 
likely appropriate when a public official obtains cash or property outside the campaign system 
because there are few legitimate explanations for such gifts.‖ Id. at 517. 
 95. See id. at 518 (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 263 F.3d 645, 653 (6th Cir. 2001)) 
(―Indeed, in circumstances like this one—outside the campaign context—[r]ather than requir[e] 
an explicit quid-pro-quo promise, the elements of extortion are satisfied by something short of a 
formalized and thoroughly articulated contractual arrangement . . . .‖). Furthermore, the Sixth 
Circuit adopted the exact same language from the Second Circuit in determining that ―Evans 
modified the standard in non-campaign contribution cases.‖ Id. at 517. 
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the court will adjudicate future campaign contribution cases, the 
Sixth Circuit‘s holding in Abbey strongly indicates that it now views 
McCormick and Evans as establishing two separate standards. 
E. Minority View—The Eleventh Circuit and  
United States v. Siegelman 
Initially, the Eleventh Circuit held that McCormick and Evans 
established two different standards, with McCormick applying solely 
to campaign contribution cases.
96
 In United States v. Martinez,
97
 the 
court ruled that under Evans, any jury instructions for Hobbs Act 
extortion trials must contain a quid pro quo instruction.
98
  
In the recent case of United States v. Siegelman, the Eleventh 
Circuit radically departed from the precedent established in 
Martinez.
99
 The former Governor of Alabama, Don Eugene 
Siegelman, was convicted of federal funds bribery,
100
 honest services 
mail fraud,
101
 and conspiracy
102
 in 2006.
103
 On appeal, Siegelman 
 
 96. Yarbrough, supra note 62, at 798. 
 97. 14 F.3d 543 (11th Cir. 1994). The case dealt with the Hobbs Act conviction of the 
former mayor of Hialeah, Florida, who forced local realtors to sell him property for below 
market value. See id. at 544–46. 
 98. Id. at 553. Notably, the court characterized Evans as establishing the quid pro quo 
requirement ―outside the context of campaign contributions‖ and held that Evans modified the 
McCormick standard for non-campaign contribution cases. Id. The court explicitly noted that 
the Second Circuit had reached the same conclusion in Garcia, and agreed with it. See id. at 
553 n.4. The Eleventh Circuit thus made it clear that it would apply the McCormick requirement 
of explicit quid pro quo agreements to campaign contribution cases. Yarbrough, supra note 62, 
at 800. 
 99. 561 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 
3542 (2010). 
 100. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2006). Public officials may not corruptly solicit or demand, or accept 
or agree ―to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded 
in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of‖ the official‘s 
organization. Id. § 666(a)(1)(B). 
 101. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 bans the use of the Postal Services or the mails to further ―any 
scheme or artifice to defraud.‖ Section 1346 defines ―any scheme or artifice to defraud‖ to 
include ―a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.‖ The 
Supreme Court recently narrowed the honest services fraud statute to apply to only bribery or 
kickback schemes. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010). 
 102. Conspiracy occurs ―[i]f two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense 
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner 
or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the 
conspiracy.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
 103. Siegelman, 561 F.3d at 1223. The conviction was based upon allegations that 
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argued that under McCormick, the government was required to prove 
the existence of an explicit quid pro quo between himself and the 
contributor for a campaign contribution case.
104
 
The Eleventh Circuit, however, chose to apply both McCormick 
and Evans to Siegelman‘s case.105 The court noted the strong public 
policy reasons to not infringe upon legal campaign donations.
106
 The 
court found, however, that while McCormick had required an explicit 
quid pro quo agreement, the Supreme Court in Evans modified the 
 
Siegelman had accepted a donation for a ballot initiative campaign he sponsored in return for 
giving the contributor a seat on Alabama‘s Certificate of Need Review Board. See id. at 1219–
23. The campaign was for a ballot initiative to establish a state lottery in Alabama, a platform of 
Siegelman‘s initial gubernatorial campaign. Id. at 1220. Siegelman had solicited a donation 
from Richard Scrushy, the former CEO of HealthSouth, a large hospital corporation in 
Alabama. Id. at 1219–20. The Certificate of Need (CON) Board regulated healthcare services in 
Alabama, and Scrushy had already served on the CON Board under the three previous 
governors. Id. Former Siegelman aide Nick Bailey testified that Scrushy had delivered a check 
to Siegelman, and when Bailey asked Siegelman what Scrushy would want for it, Siegelman 
responded, ―the CON Board.‖ Id. at 1221. The court later cited this exchange as proof of the 
existence of a quid pro quo agreement between Siegelman and Scrushy. See id. at 1227. Bailey 
later testified that he could not remember the details of that meeting. Id. at 1221 n.6. 
 104. See Brief of Governor Don Siegelman, Appellant at 24, United States v. Siegelman, 
561 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-13163-B), 2008 WL 2442104, at *24. 
 105. Siegelman, 561 F.3d at 1226. Notably, this case did not deal with Hobbs Act 
extortion, as McCormick, Evans, and all prior and subsequent case law did. See supra Part I.B–
C. However, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the same standards established by 
McCormick and Evans applied to bribery and honest services mail fraud, noting ―that extortion 
and bribery are but ‗different sides of the same coin.‘‖ Id. at 1225 (citing United States v. Allen, 
10 F.3d 405, 411 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
 106. See id. at 1224. It explained: 
[The convictions] impact the First Amendment‘s core values–protection of free 
political speech and the right to support issues of great public importance. It would be 
a particularly dangerous legal error from a civic point of view to instruct a jury that 
they may convict a defendant for his exercise of either of these constitutionally 
protected activities. 
Id. Furthermore, the court noted that these protections would apply with special force to an 
issue-advocacy campaign such as this one, because individual politicians would not directly 
benefit from donations to the campaigns: 
Arguably, the potential negative impact of these statutes on issue-advocacy campaigns 
is even more dangerous than it is to candidate-election campaigns. Issue-advocacy 
campaigns are a fundamental right in a free and democratic society and contributions 
to them do not financially benefit the individual politician in the same way that a 
candidate-election campaign does. 
Id. at 1224 n.13. The Supreme Court has made the same observation, describing referendums or 
issue-advocacy campaigns as ―the type of speech indispensable to decision-making in a 
democracy.‖ First Nat‘l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). 
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standard even in campaign contribution cases.
107
 The quid pro quo 
need only be explicit, not express, and an explicit agreement ―may be 
‗implied from [the official‘s] words and actions.‘‖108 Therefore, even 
if there was no jury instruction regarding an explicit quid pro quo 
requirement, and even if there was no direct evidence of an explicit 
agreement, the court found that the jury could still infer an agreement 
for a specific action in return for a campaign donation.
109
 The 
Eleventh Circuit thus became the only circuit since the early 1990s to 
find that McCormick and Evans do not establish separate standards. 
II. ANALYSIS 
While the proper relationship between McCormick and Evans for 
the campaign contribution context is not entirely clear, the Eleventh 
Circuit‘s reasoning in Siegelman seems highly questionable. The 
Eleventh Circuit inserted its own language into Evans with the 
Siegelman decision, forcing a false reconciliation between 
McCormick and Evans.
110
 The court both reads too far into the 
connection between McCormick and Evans for campaign 
contribution cases and places too much emphasis on the difference 
between ―explicit‖ and ―express‖ for determining how to define the 
McCormick standard.
111
  
 
 107. Siegelman, 561 F.3d at 1226 (―The instruction . . . in Evans required that the 
acceptance of the campaign donation be in return for a specific official action—a quid pro 
quo.‖). 
 108. Id. (quoting United States v. Evans, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992)). The court claimed that 
Siegelman had argued in his brief that ―only express words of promise overheard by third 
parties or by means of electronic surveillance will do.‖ Id. The court cited the now-outdated 
distinction between ―explicit‖ and ―express‖ from Blandford in determining that an agreement 
need not be express. See id.; see also supra note 67 (explaining the prior distinction and 
showing that ―explicit‖ and ―express‖ are now defined interchangeably). Furthermore, nowhere 
in the brief does Siegelman argue that an agreement need be express rather than explicit, and in 
fact refers to ―explicit quid pro quo‖ throughout. See Brief of Governor Don Siegelman, 
Appellant, supra note 104. 
 109. Siegelman, 561 F.3d at 1228–29. 
 110. See supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text. 
 111. For an explanation on the difference between the two definitions, see supra note 67. 
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A. False Reconciliation 
In Siegelman, the Eleventh Circuit believed that McCormick and 
Evans could be reconciled, holding that the explicit agreement for a 
campaign donation required by McCormick could be implied from an 
official‘s words or actions, citing Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence in 
Evans.
112
 However, nowhere in the Evans opinion does the majority 
refer to McCormick or state that the decision in any way modifies 
McCormick, except to say that the jury instructions given in Evans 
satisfies the McCormick quid pro quo requirement.
113
 Evans also does 
not refer to campaign contributions in the majority opinion, except to 
note that the public official in that case had received both cash and a 
check for his re-election campaign, only the latter of which was 
properly disclosed.
114
 Therefore, the only way Evans could have 
completely modified McCormick in the campaign contribution 
context without the Supreme Court needing to say so explicitly is if 
Evans was in fact a campaign contribution case. The record on that 
point is entirely unclear,
115
 but what is clear is that the Supreme Court 
itself did not agree on that one fact.
116
 To read Evans as a clear 
 
 112. Siegelman, 561 F.3d at 1226. 
 113. Evans, 504 U.S. at 268. 
 114. See id. at 257.  
 115. Some commentators believe that by mentioning both campaign contributions and 
ordinary bribes in the record, the Court makes Evans a campaign contribution case, thus 
modifying McCormick. See, e.g., Yarbrough, supra note 62, at 812 (―The language of the 
Court‘s decision and the fact that Evans involved alleged campaign contributions indicates that 
Evans should be read with, rather than separate from, McCormick.‖). However, others note that 
the Supreme Court treated that fact ambiguously. See Hager, supra note 30, at 216 (―[T]he 
Court [in Evans] measures the ‗bribe‘ against the McCormick standard, without ever addressing 
the difference between the $1,000 donation to the campaign and the $7,000 received directly by 
Evans . . . .‖); Hardy, supra note 55, at 427 (―The majority opinion in Evans never explicitly 
indicated whether it considered the case to involve a claimed campaign contribution, although 
the concurring and dissenting opinions offered contradictory interpretations.‖). 
 116. Nowhere in the majority opinion does the Supreme Court state that Evans is or is not a 
campaign contribution case. Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence indicates that Evans is a campaign 
contribution case. See Evans, 504 U.S. at 277–78 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (―The requirement 
of a quid pro quo in a § 1951 prosecution such as the one before us, in which it is alleged that 
money was given to the public official in the form of a campaign contribution, was established 
by our decision last Term in McCormick v. United States.‖). In his dissenting opinion, however, 
Justice Thomas noted that the holding in McCormick was expressly limited to campaign 
contributions, and stated that Evans extended McCormick‘s limitation to all cases of official 
extortion. See id. at 287 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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campaign contribution case that extensively modifies McCormick, as 
the Eleventh Circuit did in Siegelman, is to insert language into 
Evans that is simply not there. 
Furthermore, McCormick and Evans were decided only one year 
apart.
117
 Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Evans after 
dissenting a year earlier in McCormick, partially on the grounds that 
he did not then believe that the quid pro quo agreement for a 
campaign contribution needs to be explicit.
118
 Justice Kennedy‘s 
concurrence in Evans largely echoed Justice Stevens‘ dissent from 
McCormick on that issue.
119
 However, Justice Stevens did not refer to 
explicitness at all in the majority opinion in Evans. If Justice Stevens 
had meant for Evans to modify McCormick in the context of 
campaign contribution explicitness and allow the quid pro quo 
requirement to encompass implied agreements, it seems strange he 
would have neglected to say anything at all on the issue when writing 
the majority opinion in Evans. 
B. Explicit vs. Express 
Much of the Eleventh Circuit‘s analysis in Siegelman focuses on 
the difference between ―explicit‖ and ―express.‖ The court noted that 
while McCormick used ―explicit‖ to describe the necessary quid pro 
quo agreement, ―explicit‖ did not have the same definition as 
―express.‖120 The court defined an ―express‖ agreement as actual 
conversations ―overheard by third parties or by means of electronic 
surveillance.‖121  
 
 117. McCormick was decided on May 23, 1991. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 
(1991). Evans was decided on May 26, 1992. 504 U.S. at 255. 
 118. See McCormick, 500 U.S. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting). ―In my opinion there is no 
statutory requirement that illegal agreements, threats, or promises be in writing, or in any 
particular form. Subtle extortion is just as wrongful—and probably much more common—than 
the kind of express understanding that the Court‘s opinion seems to require.‖ Id. However, 
Stevens did agree that the crime does require a quid pro quo. See id. at 283. 
 119. See 504 U.S. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Like Stevens, Kennedy cautioned 
against subtle extortion: ―The official and the payor need not state the quid pro quo in express 
terms, for otherwise the law‘s effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods.‖ Id. 
 120. United States v. Siegelman, 561 F.3d 1215, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2009), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (2010). 
 121. Id. at 1226. The court claimed that Siegelman himself had advanced that argument. 
―Defendants argue that only ‗proof of actual conversations by defendants,‘ will do, suggesting 
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Largely relying on the Sixth Circuit‘s analysis in Blandford,122 the 
Eleventh Circuit determined that McCormick required quid pro quo 
agreements to be explicit, not express, and that under Evans, an 
explicit agreement could be implied from an official‘s words or 
actions.
123
 Therefore, the court held that the jury could have 
determined that Governor Siegelman had an explicit agreement with 
his campaign contributor absent any proof of such conversation 
having taken place.
124
 The Sixth Circuit in Blandford looked to 
Black‘s Law Dictionary and determined that while an ―explicit‖ 
agreement merely meant clear and unambiguous, an ―express‖ 
agreement meant one ―directly and distinctly stated.‖125 The Eleventh 
Circuit in Siegelman adopted this rationale, noting that there was no 
need for a quid pro quo agreement to actually be stated.
126
  
The current legal definitions of those terms, however, make no 
such distinction. In the most recent edition of Black‘s Law 
Dictionary, ―explicit‖ is not even defined as a separate term, while 
―express‖ is defined as ―[c]learly and unmistakably communicated; 
directly stated.‖127 Barron‘s likewise does not define explicit as a 
separate term, but lists it as part of the definition of ―express.‖128  
The non-legal, plain meaning definitions of ―explicit‖ and 
―express‖ further indicate that the two words are synonymous. New 
Oxford defines both words as stated clearly and definitively.
129
 
 
in their brief that only express words of promise overheard by third parties or by means of 
electronic surveillance will do.‖ Id. However, the defendant‘s brief did not actually argue that 
the agreement needed to be express, only explicit. See Brief of Governor Don Siegelman, 
Appellant, supra note 104, at 24. 
 122. See United States v. Blandford, 33 F.3d 685, 696 (6th Cir. 1994) (―Evans instructed 
that by ‘explicit‘ McCormick did not mean ‗express.‘‖). 
 123. Siegelman, 561 F.3d at 1226. 
 124. See id. at 1227–28. 
 125. 33 F.3d at 696 n.13. For the full definitions from the 1990 edition of Black‘s Law 
Dictionary as used in Blandford, see supra note 67. 
 126. See 561 F.3d at 1226 (―But there is no requirement that this agreement be 
memorialized in a writing, or even, as defendants suggest, be overheard by a third party.‖). 
 127. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009); see also supra note 67. 
 128. Barron‘s definition of ―express‖ is ―to make known explicitly and in declared terms. 
To set forth an actual agreement in words, written or spoken, which unambiguously signifies 
intent. As distinguished from ‗implied,‘ the term is not left to implication or inference from 
conduct or circumstances.‖ BARRON‘S LAW DICTIONARY 189–90 (5th ed. 2003) (emphasis 
added). 
 129. The New Oxford American Dictionary defines ―explicit‖ as ―stated clearly and in 
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Webster‘s defines explicit and express as synonyms, characterized as 
not leaving anything implied.
130
 These definitions all indicate that the 
Eleventh Circuit simply split hairs between ―explicit‖ and ―express‖ 
in determining that Evans modified McCormick in the campaign 
context so that an explicit agreement could actually be implicit.
131
 
There is simply no indication in either McCormick or Evans that the 
Court meant for the word ―explicit‖ to mean anything other than its 
plain meaning—clear, unambiguous, direct, and leaving nothing to 
inference. By their very definitions, a quid pro quo agreement cannot 
be both explicit and implicit, as the Eleventh Circuit indicates it 
can.
132
 
III. PROPOSAL 
Absent a clearer statement from the Supreme Court regarding the 
proper relationship between McCormick and Evans in the campaign 
contribution context, other courts should be wary of adopting the 
Eleventh Circuit‘s rationale from Siegelman. As has been 
demonstrated, Siegelman’s approach to McCormick and Evans is at 
once overly broad and overly narrow—broad in that it reads into 
Evans a wholesale change to McCormick, and narrow in that it hinges 
the entire rationale for the change on the doubtful difference between 
―explicit‖ and ―express.‖133 The Supreme Court should grant 
certiorari in the Siegelman case to resolve the dispute.
134
 It is 
 
detail, leaving no room for confusion or doubt.‖ NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 594 (2d 
ed. 2005). It defines ―express‖ as ―definitely stated, not merely implied.‖ Id. at 595. 
 130. Webster‘s Dictionary defines ―explicit‖ as ―characterized by full clear expression; 
being without vagueness or ambiguity; leaving nothing implied.‖ WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 801 (1993). 
―Express‖ is defined as ―directly and distinctly stated or expressed rather than implied or left to 
inference; not dubious or ambiguous.‖ Id. at 803. The dictionary states under each entry that 
explicit and express are synonyms for each other. Id. at 801, 803. 
 131. See Brief Amici Curiae of Former Attorneys General in Support of Petitioner at 12, 
Siegelman v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (2010) (No. 09-182), 2009 WL 2943372, at *12 
(―The Eleventh Circuit‘s holding that ‗explicit‘ does not mean ‗express‘ ignores the ordinary 
meaning of ‗explicit‘. . . .‖). 
 132. See Siegelman, 561 F.3d at 1227–28. 
 133. Id. at 1225–27. 
 134. In June 2010, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the original Siegelman 
decision to the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration on the issue of the honest services 
fraud charge, after narrowing the application of the honest services fraud statute in Skilling v. 
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especially important in light of the recent Citizens United decision,
135
 
which affirmed the importance of unfettered political speech under 
the First Amendment regardless of the identity or influence of the 
speaker, that the Supreme Court clarifies the status of this other 
restriction on the political process.
136
 In the meantime, other courts 
should differentiate the McCormick and Evans standards by context 
as articulated by the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, as this rule 
strikes an appropriate balance between prosecuting corruption 
without unduly burdening legitimate political activity. 
A. Separate Standards Create a Bright-Line Rule 
The Supreme Court should uphold the separation of the 
McCormick and Evans standards in order to maintain a bright-line 
distinction between campaign contributions and other payoffs to 
public officials.
137
 The entire purpose of the explicit quid pro quo 
standard from McCormick was ―to clearly define and delimit the type 
of conduct that may be criminalized in the campaign contribution 
context.‖138 The explicit quid pro quo requirement as upheld by the 
other circuits strikes the proper balance between respecting legitimate 
 
United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). See Siegelman v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (2010). 
The Eleventh Circuit subsequently affirmed its prior decision. See United States v. Siegelman, 
640 F.3d 1159 (2011). 
 135. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 136. As Justice Kennedy himself noted:  
Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics. It is in the 
nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary 
corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those policies. It is well 
understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a 
vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is that the candidate 
will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is 
premised on responsiveness. 
Id. at 910 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring and dissenting in part)). This undoubtedly fits with the observation in McCormick 
that such behavior ―is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by private 
contributions or expenditures, as they have been from the beginning of the Nation.‖ McCormick 
v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 272 (1991). 
 137. See Brief Amici Curiae of Former Attorneys General in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 131, at 15. 
 138. Id. at 4. The explicit quid pro quo requirement from McCormick ―defines the 
forbidden zone of conduct with sufficient clarity.‖ 500 U.S. at 273. 
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fundraising activity and maintaining the effectiveness of the extortion 
or bribery statutes.
139
 
To muddle this bright line between campaign contributions and 
ordinary payoffs would expose every government official who acts to 
the benefit of a contributor to criminal prosecution.
140
 It would grant 
prosecutors ―the unbridled power to potentially indict and convict 
any public official‖ for merely accepting a campaign donation 
knowing that the donation was made with the expectation that the 
official would act for the contributor‘s benefit.141 It also creates the 
danger that, in a politically charged atmosphere, prosecutors will 
wield this discretion in a partisan fashion.
142
 Having a clear legal 
standard for campaign contribution cases will protect individuals 
―from politically-motivated prosecutions based on conduct that‖ has 
always been considered legal within the campaign finance system.
143
 
 
 139. Eric David Weissman, Note, McCormick v. United States: The Quid Pro Quo 
Requirement in Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 433, 
461 (1993). 
 140. Brief Amici Curiae of Former Attorneys General in Support of Petitioner, supra note 
131, at 4; see also Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari at 15, Siegelman v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (2010) (No. 09-182), 2009 WL 
2759758, at *15 (―[I]t creates a genuine uncertainty for public officials and potential 
contributors to political campaigns as to whether criminal charges may result from making a 
contribution with the hope or expectation . . . that some favorable treatment will come from the 
recipient, and the expectation is then fulfilled.‖). 
 141. Brief Amici Curiae of Former Attorneys General in Support of Petitioner, supra note 
131, at 19. This result was explicitly rejected in McCormick: 
Whatever ethical considerations and appearances may indicate, to hold that legislators 
commit the federal crime of extortion when they act for the benefit of constituents or 
support legislation furthering the interests of some of their constituents, shortly before 
or after campaign contributions are solicited and received from those beneficiaries, is 
an unrealistic assessment of what Congress could have meant by making it a crime to 
obtain property from another, with his consent, ―under color of official right.‖ 
500 U.S. at 272. 
 142. This has been one of the main criticisms of the Siegelman decision. See Beale, supra 
note 26, at 387 (―[T]he main focus of concern has been on the allegations that the Siegelman 
prosecution was politically motivated and orchestrated by Karl Rove and others . . . .‖). This 
was also a concern of the former state attorneys general who filed a brief amici curiae in 
support of Siegelman. See Brief Amici Curiae of Former Attorneys General in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 131, at 19 (―Amici have grave concerns that this opportunity for arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement of the ‗honest services‘ and ‗bribery‘ statutes has resulted in 
the selective and unfair prosecution and conviction of Governor Siegelman.‖). 
 143. Brief Amici Curiae of Former Attorneys General in Support of Petitioner, supra note 
131, at 25. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
286 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 36:261 
 
 
As Justice Kennedy himself has noted, equating favoritism or 
influence with corruption would prohibit pure political loyalty 
altogether.
144
 
B. Are Systemic Changes Needed? 
Perhaps corruption in the form of quid pro quo agreements 
between contributors and public officials, whether explicit or not, is 
inherent in an electoral system that heavily relies upon large 
contributions to finance campaigns.
145
 The presence of large private 
campaign contributions will always raise questions of how public 
officials can act objectively for the benefit of the entire electorate, not 
just for wealthy contributors.
146
 In a system that depends on large 
private donations, public officials perhaps cannot always say that 
they represent only the public good.
147
 
In order to combat this risk of corruption, the electorate must 
demand either a change in the role of private money in elections or 
strict regulations on campaigns to ensure that candidates are not 
subject to inappropriate influence.
148
 A move towards public 
financing of campaigns would take ―direct aim at the large private 
donations that are argued to lead to greater perceptions of 
corruption.‖149 A public financing system able to provide sufficient 
 
 144. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 540 U.S. 93, 296 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring and dissenting in part) (―Access in itself, however, shows only that in a general 
sense an officeholder favors someone or that someone has influence on the officeholder. There 
is no basis, in law or in fact, to say favoritism or influence in general is the same as corrupt 
favoritism or influence in particular.‖); id. (―Any given action might be favored by any given 
person, so by the Court's reasoning political loyalty of the purest sort can be prohibited.‖). 
 145. See McCormick, 500 U.S. at 272.  
 146. See Sonia Sotomayor & Nicole A. Gordon, Returning Majesty to the Law and 
Politics: A Modern Approach, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 35, 42 (1996) (―Yet our system of 
election financing permits extensive private, including corporate, financing of candidates‘ 
campaigns, raising again and again the question what the difference is between contributions 
and bribes and how legislators or other officials can operate objectively on behalf of the 
electorate.‖). 
 147. See id. (―Can elected officials say with credibility that they are carrying out the 
mandate of a ‗democratic‘ society, representing only the general public good, when private 
money plays such a large role in their campaigns?‖). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Beth Ann Rosenson, The Effect of Political Reform Measures on Perceptions of 
Corruption, 8 ELECTION L.J. 31, 35 (2009). 
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funding would also free up candidates‘ time to communicate directly 
with voters, time they would otherwise spend fundraising.
150
 
Failure to enact meaningful reform, either public financing or 
other measures to regulate large private donations, will continue to 
damage public trust in elected officials and candidates.
151
 However, 
the responsibility to enact such changes to the campaign finance 
system lies with Congress. Until Congress passes these reforms, 
courts must continue to apply the precedent established by 
McCormick—that large campaign contributions do not constitute 
bribery or extortion unless accompanied by an explicit quid pro quo 
agreement between the contributor and the candidate.
152
 
CONCLUSION 
Stopping the corrupt practice of public officials agreeing to 
perform an official act in return for payoffs is an important objective. 
Anytime a candidate accepts a kickback from a campaign contributor 
in return for performing a specific official action, it serves to 
undermine public trust in the government. However, attempts to 
regulate illicit quid pro quo agreements in the campaign context must 
not unduly restrict legitimate campaign fundraising. As the Court 
noted in McCormick, candidates soliciting money from supporters 
who expect favorable treatment constitutes conduct well within the 
law.
153
 In contrast, a public official not running for office would have 
few legitimate reasons to solicit or accept political funds.
154
 The 
McCormick standard, which criminalizes only explicit quid pro quo 
agreements between a candidate and a campaign contributor, 
provides a bright-line rule that strikes a balance between protecting 
legitimate campaign activity while punishing true corruption.
155
 
 
 150. Emma Greenman, Strengthening the Hand of Voters in the Marketplace of Ideas: 
Roadmap to Campaign Finance Reform in a Post-Wisconsin Right to Life Era, 24 J.L. & POL. 
209, 245 (2008). 
 151. Sotomayor & Gordon, supra note 146, at 42. 
 152. Id. at 272–73. 
 153. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991). 
 154. Weissman, supra note 139, at 462. 
 155. 500 U.S. at 272–73. 
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The majority of circuits have accepted this important distinction 
between the campaign and non-campaign contexts.
156
 Only the 
Eleventh Circuit has held that there is no distinction, and that quid 
pro quo agreements do not need to be explicit in order to be illegal.
157
 
This decision muddles the law of campaign finance and exposes to 
possible prosecution any public official who solicits campaign 
donations.
158
 In order to prevent this outcome, other courts should 
reject the Eleventh Circuit‘s rationale and maintain the stricter 
evidentiary standard for campaign contributions. 
 
 156. See supra notes 17–21. 
 157. See supra notes 99–109. 
 158. See supra notes 138–41. 
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